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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) will soon be om-
nipresent and billions of sensors and actuators will support our
industries and well-being. IoT devices are embedded systems
that are connected using wireless technology for most of the
cases. The availability of the wireless network serving the IoT,
the privacy, integrity and trustworthiness of the data are of
critical importance, since IoT will drive businesses and personal
decisions. This paper proposes a new approach in the wireless
security domain that leverages advanced wireless technology and
the emergence of the unmanned aerial system or vehicle (UAS
or UAV). We consider the problem of eavesdropping and analyze
how UAVs can aid in reducing, or overcoming this threat in the
mobile IoT context. The results show that huge improvements
in terms of channel secrecy rate can be achieved when UAVs
assist base stations for relaying the information to the desired IoT
nodes. Our approach is technology agnostic and can be expanded
to address other communications security aspects.
Index Terms–IoT, wireless communications, secrecy rate, secu-
rity, UAS, UAV.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications networks are omnipresent and
provide nationwide coverage for commercial use in many
countries. Mobile users or devices today are mainly served by
cellular communications services. The 4G long-term evolution
(LTE) is widespread and provides broadband mobile access to
terrestrial users. New use cases and applications for advanced
wireless systems, especially in the industry automation and
vehicular control, require more stringent performance features
in terms of reliability, latency and security. The 5G ecosystem
will provide an overarching framework for delivering flexible
and customizable networking and end-to-end services. It will
connect simple sensors, actuators, user devices, sophisticated
industrial control systems, medical systems, vehicles, cities,
and critical infrastructure [1]. It will enable massive Internet
of Things (IoT) deployments, where low cost, low power, and
low complexity are critical [2].
In an era where digital data dominates businesses and
society as a whole, the IoT has emerged as a natural evolution
of embedded systems that have been supporting many indus-
tries and end users for decades. Billions of IoT devices will
soon be deployed for supporting precision agriculture, search
and rescue, smart transportation, critical infrastructure, and so
forth. What all these devices have in common is that they need
to be connected to the Internet. Wireless communications is
the only viable solution for most of the IoT use cases because
of practical deployment considerations [3].
Cellular communications networks will play a major role for
providing connectivity to the IoT [4]. The Third Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) therefore introduced the narrow-
band IoT (NB-IoT) standard as part of its LTE framework
in Release 13. It allows using LTE systems to serve IoT
devices using the smallest allocateable resource, one resource
block [5].
Because of the broad IoT use cases, from user-centric
applications to business-centric data, security becomes a very
important element of the IoT [6]. But, security is often not
rigorously implemented for most of the cases because of
resource limitations, among others. The focus of this paper
is on secure communications systems that serve the IoT.
Security of communications encompasses many aspects, such
as identification, availability, privacy and accountability. This
paper considers the security of cellular networks serving IoT
devices and proposes the use of an unmanned aerial system
(UAS) to act as a network support node to improve the data
confidentiality or secrecy of the data. More precisely, we
analyze the secrecy rate of using a moving UAS serving a
mobile IoT device.
The UAS or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has recently
gained attention for supporting non-military applications [7].
A future UAS can be seen as an IoT device that collects sensor
data, for example. The UAS can also carry several IoT devices,
or serve as the collector of sensor data. In the latter case, an
UAS node can be used as an access point for IoT sensors to
upload their data while the UAS is close enough for reliable
and low power transmission, a need for most IoT devices.
Communications systems for UAVs or with UAVs have been
analyzed by the research community and industry [8]. 3GPP,
in particular, is evaluating UAV use cases and developing
specifications for supporting UAVs with 5G technology. This
paper is agnostic to the communications protocol and pro-
vides early results on UAV-assisted networking for the IoT,
considering mobility. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: Section II discusses the fundamental wireless security
principles and how they apply to this context. Section III
introduces the system models for the air-to-ground (A2G) and
ground-to-ground (G2G) channels, for the mobility and for the
secrecy rate. Section IV provides a numerical analysis of the
effect of using aerial relays for increasing the channel secrecy
rate against eavesdropping. Our results show that the mobility
of UAVs and the properties of channels can be leveraged to
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increase the secrecy rate. Section V concludes the paper.
II. WIRELESS SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS
There are different types of attacks that can compromise
wireless communications systems. The attack can come from
an UAS and can affect the safe operation of aerial vehicles,
which are characterized by high maneuverability, dynamic
changes in mobility patterns and often dominant line of sight
(LoS) radio links.
A. Identification, Authenticity, and Integrity
Any cellular network user needs to be identified and autho-
rized by the network to access its services. In addition, the
network needs to be authenticated by the users so that mutual
trust can be established. Man in the middle attacks affect the
integrity of messages by capturing the transmitted data and
forwarding a manipulated version to the destination [9]
B. Availability
Capacity is a common metric used for evaluating modern
wireless communications systems. Malicious users can exploit
the fact that radio resources are limited and can leverage
knowledge about how they are managed by the network. If,
for example, malicious users create fake service requests or
participate in broadcasting fake messages, the radio frequency
(RF) spectrum will become congested and the communica-
tions services less reliable and potentially less available [10].
Mechanisms that allow recovering corrupted or lost messages
are usually based on retransmission and additional processing.
This adds to the RF congestion, increases latency and power
consumption, among others. GPS spoofing attacks typically
provide false location coordinates and, possibly, time offsets
which can then lead to RF interference and service unavail-
ability.
C. Confidentiality and Privacy
Eavesdroppers can capture packets or monitor user/network
activity to compromise confidentiality and privacy [11].
The identities, positions, actions and trajectories of mobile
users/IoT devices therefore need to be securely transmitted
to avoid unauthorized tracking of devices and exploitation of
data. For most cases, it is important that devices regularly
report their presence and control or sensor data. This increases
the attack surface and poses security challenges, especially for
the IoT, where resources are limited.
D. Non-Repudiation and Accountability
A malfunctioning or malicious device can significantly
compromise the radio access network performance. For
example, a device that is not adhering to the time advance
commands sent by the serving base station, can create
significant interference from its transmission. Many outdoor
devices use GPS signals as the synchronization source, but
can use infrastructure nodes, where available, or other sources.
If no external source exists, frequency and timing drifts will
occur that add up over time. This can cause significant
interference and system malfunctioning. The system needs to
monitor such transmissions, or unauthorized transmissions,
in general, and make the corresponding devices accountable
before they cause major damage to the network operation.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED WORK
A. Problem Formulation
The eavesdropping attack is the ability of a malicious node
to intercept exchanged packets between legitimate nodes or
fixed infrastructure. This type of attack can be very harm-
ful for IoT networks because of the anonymous leakage of
confidential information without legitimate transmitter/receiver
knowledge. To this end, the aerial relay has been proposed as
a mitigation technique to minimize the eavesdropper’s wiretap
link rate. The objective of this paper is to illustrate how UAV
path planning and speed of the aerial relay can influence the
secrecy rate of a mobile IoT device in the presence of an
eavesdropper.
Figure 1 illustrates a scenario where an authenticated UAV
is relaying messages between a cellular base station and
ground IoT device, while a ground eavesdropper is attacking
the direct link between the user equipment (UE) and the base
station.
B. Related Work
Early research has shown how UAVs can extend cellular
networks and be used to improve the security of terrestrial
networks [12]–[14]. References [12] and [13] propose using
UAVs as jammers to enhance the physical layer security of
cellular networks. They investigate the effects of having a
strong LoS jamming link between the UAV and a single or
multiple eavesdroppers. Reference [14] discusses the use of
UAVs as mobile relays to improve the results of static relays
for static ground users. The authors use the difference-of-
concave (DC) program to solve the secrecy rate maximization
problem and find that each DC iteration yields a closed-form
solution.
This paper extends those initial results [12]–[14] and con-
siders the UAV dynamics to gain new insights on how UAVs
can be effectively used to increase the secrecy of the channel.
We consider the mobility parameters of the UAV and study the
secrecy rate for mobile IoT ground devices. We compare the
proposed UAV relaying approach to a base station handover.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Air-to-Ground Channel Model
For a ground receiver, the received signals from a UAV
features the LoS signal, non-LoS (NLoS) signals and multiple
reflected components which cause multipath fading [15]. The
resulting A2G mean pathloss can be calculated as
PLς(d, ht, hr) = FSPL (d) + ης (ht, hr) , (1)
where ς = {LOS,NLOS}, d is the communication distance,
ht and hr denote the heights of the transmitter (Tx) and
receiver (Rx), FSPL (d) = 20log10
(
4pifd
c
)
is the free space
Fig. 1: UAVs as authenticated and malicious nodes in a 5G
cellular network.
pathloss model, and ης (ht, hr) is the mean value of the
excessive pathloss. The parameters f and c stand for the carrier
frequency and the speed of light.
According to field test measurements [15], the occurrence
probability of a LOS link ρLoS(θ) between a UAV transmitter
and a ground receiver is given by
ρLoS(θ) =
1
1 + C exp [−B (θ − C)] ,
θ =
180
pi
arctan
(
ht
r
)
,
(2)
where C and B are constant values that depend on the com-
munications environment, e.g. rural, urban, or dense urban.
Parameter ht represents the height of the UAV transmitter and
r the horizontal distance between the UAV and the ground
receiver. Note that the LoS and NLoS probabilities are related
as ρNLoS(θ) = 1− ρLoS(θ).
The spatial expectation of pathloss is given by
PL(θ, d, ht, hr) =
∑
ς
ρς(θ)PLς(d, ht, hr). (3)
The path loss is higher for a NLoS than for a LoS link because
of shadowing and indirect signal paths. We use the parameter
η = ηLOSηNLOS to denote the ratio of excessive attenuation factor
for NLoS links compared to LOS links.
The Nakagami-m distribution is used to describe the small
scale fading g in A2G channels.
B. Ground-to-Ground Channel Model
For ground communications, we consider both the distance
dependent large-scale fading and small-scale fading. The sig-
nal transmitted from the ground transmitter is attenuated with a
coefficient fG = gd−α, where g is the channel power gain with
exponential distribution, d is the communication link distance
between the ground transmitter and receiver, and α is the path-
loss exponent.
The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of ground communications
is given by
SNRG =
PT fG
Bn0
, (4)
where PT indicates the transmit power of the ground transmit-
ter, B is the channel bandwidth and n0 is the noise spectral
density.
C. Mobility Model
In this paper, we consider a mobile IoT device. We
examine the secrecy rate of this mobile IoT device with a
static eavesdropper. Without loss of generality, the mobility
of the ground user and the aerial relay will be over the x-axis
with fixed y-position for all nodes (Tx, Rx, and relay). First
we define two parameters that will be used for deriving our
mobility model:
• The distance step (dx) is a constant step size that
corresponds to the granularity of movement.
• The speed rate (SR) is a ratio that defines how fast
the UAV flies with respect to the mobile IoT device.
When SR = 1, the UAV will maintain the same speed
as the moving IoT device and closely follow it (same x
coordinates). When SR > 1, the UAV will be in front of
the ground IoT receiver. When SR < 1, the UAV will
lag the IoT receiver.
The following model is used to define the mobility of the
ground IoT device and the UAV relay:
IoTXt+1 = IoTXt + dx, (5)
UAVXt+1 = SR ∗ IoTXt+1 , (6)
where IoTXt+1 and UAVXt+1 are the next x-positions of the
ground IoT device and aerial relay in the next time step.
UAVXt+1 is calculated as a function of the position of IoT
device and the speed rate.
D. Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we present the secrecy rate of the ground
legitimate user where an authenticated UAV serves as an aerial
relay. The UAV forwards the user information. The secrecy
rate RSec of the ground legitimate user is then calculated as
the difference of the legitimate information rate RL and the
interception rate RI , i.e., RSec = max (RL −RI , 0). More
specifically, we have
RL = max
(
RLT , R
L
R
)
, (7)
RI = max
(
RIT , R
I
R
)
, (8)
where RLT is the data rate from the legitimate transmitter to
the legitimate receiver, RLR is the data rate from the legitimate
aerial relay to the legitimate receiver, RIT is the data rate from
the legitimate transmitter to the eavesdropper, and RIR is the
data rate from the legitimate aerial relay to the eavesdropper.
Considering a UAV that serves as an aerial relay, we split
a time-slot into two parts. One is for the UAV receiving
information from the ground transmitter, and the other is for
UAV transmitting data to the ground receiver.
More specifically, we have
RLT = Blog2
(
1 +
g‖xBS − xUE‖−α
Bn0
)
, (9)
RLR =Blog2 (1 + 1/Bn0
· PL(θUAV−UE , ‖xUAV − xUE‖ , hUAV , hUE)) ,
(10)
RIT = Blog2
(
1 +
g‖xBS − xEAV ‖−α
Bn0
)
, (11)
RIR =Blog2 (1 + 1/Bn0
· PL(θUAV−EAV , ‖xUAV − xEAV ‖ , hUAV , hEAV )) ,
(12)
where ‖a− b‖ denotes the distance between a and b, PL(·)
is the spatial expectation pathloss of A2G channel which is
given by (3). Therefore, the secrecy rate of the ground IoT
device is given in (13) at the top of next page.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We simulate two use cases. The first use case compares
the efficiency of the aerial relay with a traditional handover
procedure between two base stations as a mitigation technique
against eavesdropping. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. The second
use case investigates the effect of the aerial relay on the secrecy
rate as a function of the position and speed of the relay with
respect to the position of the IoT device.
A. Mobile IoT and UAV Relay Use Cases
The overarching scenario is that of a base station serving
IoT devices. We consider the downlink data transmission,
which can be a combination of user and control data or
configuration signals. This is applicable to many applications,
such as private content downloading, or software upgrades.
For the sake of illustration and without loss of generality, we
consider a single IoT device that may represent several nearby
devices.
The IoT device and the UAV relay, when used, are moving
on a straight line. They may, for example, follow a long
straight road. The IoT device and the UAV relay move at some
speeds, which are not necessarily constant nor identical. Two
base stations and one eavesdropper are considered at fixed
locations on the same road. When the UAV relay is used, the
base station uses beamforming to the UAV and the fronthaul
channel (from the base station to the UAV) is assumed to be
at full capacity and orthogonal to the access channel (UAV to
ground devices).
The UAV uses an omnidirectional antenna. The path loss
exponent is 4 and the Rayleigh distribution is used to model
TABLE I: Simulation parameters.
Simulation parameter Value
Primary base
station position
(0,0,50)
Secondary base
station position
(1400,0,50)
RX(IoT)
initial position
(0,0,0)
Eavesdropper
position
(300,0,0)
UAV relay
position
(0, 0, 20)
dx 15 m
SR 1, 2, 0.5, and 0.75
Base station power 0.1 watt
UAV power 0.01 watt
Noise variance 10-12
Bandwidth 10 MHz
the small-scale fading of ground links. The remaining simu-
lation parameters are provided in Table I.
This scenario can be scaled by adding additional IoT
devices, base stations, UAVs and eavesdroppers. When more
nodes are used, their locations and trajectories need to be
defined in the three dimensional space.
B. UAV Relay vs. Base Station Handover
1) Simulation Scenario: The ground IoT device starts mov-
ing from the initial position following the mobility model
introduced in Section IV-C. The aerial relay starts flying and
following the same trajectory as the IoT device. The IoT
device is connected to the primary base station from the start.
When the secrecy rate of the channel between the primary
base station and the IoT receiver drops, handover to another
base station is considered and the handover initiated when the
secrecy rate provided by the new association is found to be
higher.
2) Results: The results are illustrated in Fig. 3, which
compares the secrecy rates of the three strategies: normal op-
eration, base station handover, and UAV relaying. The secrecy
rate for normal operation drops gradually until reaching 0 at
the location of the eavesdropper and not recovering when the
IoT device passes it. Using a second base station and initiating
an early handover allows the secrecy rate to recover, but slowly
because of the larger distance to the second base station. With
the UAV relay, the secrecy rate is maintained at high levels
over a wide range. The rate drops steeply to zero when the IoT
device and the eavesdropper meet, but it also recovers quickly.
It is below 50 Mbps only while the IoT device is within 50
m distance to the eavesdropper.
We conclude that the use of an aerial relay as a mitiga-
tion solution for eavesdropping is more efficient than using
traditional mitigation techniques, such as handover.
RSec = max
Blog2
Bn0 +max
(
g‖xBS − xEAV ‖−α, PL(θUAV−EAV , ‖xUAV − xEAV ‖ , hUAV , hEAV )
)
Bn0 +max
(
g‖xBS − xUE‖−α, PL(θUAV−UE , ‖xUAV − xUE‖ , hUAV , hUE)
)
 , 0
 .
(13)
Fig. 2: Simulation scenario.
Fig. 3: Secrecy rate without a relay, with a UAV relay, and
with base station handover.
C. UAV Relay Trajectory
1) Simulation Scenario: The second case study analyzes
the effect of the UAV position with respect to the mobile
ground receiver on the secrecy rate, where both are mobile
and move in concert. We analyze the effect of different UAV
speeds with respect to the IoT device. We implement three
approaches of UAV mobility, leveraging the models introduced
in Section IV-C: leading (SR = 2), lagging (SR = 0.5, 0.75),
and following (SR = 1). Since the UAV and IoT device start
at the same point, the leading UAV flies ahead and away from
the IoT device, the lagging UAV behind it and the following
right above it. The IoT device and aerial relay move away
from the primary base station and pass the eavesdropper at
the fixed location of 300 m. Only one base station is involved
in this scenario.
2) Results: Fig. 4 shows the simulation results.
we observe that the UAV that closely follows the IoT device
achieves the best secrecy rate overall, which is mostly above
50 Mbps, whereas for the leading or lagging UAV the secrecy
rate is mostly below 50 Mbps. Using a small lagging factor
between UAV relay and moving ground legitimate user before
reaching the position of the eavesdropper is providing a higher
secrecy rate than the leading case. However, the leading case
exhibits a rapid recovery of the secrecy rate after passing
the eavesdropper position. Also, as the gap between UAV
relay and the moving ground user widens, for both lagging or
leading UAVs, the performance of the secrecy rate declines.
This is result of lower legitimate rate between a ground user
and UAV because of lower SNR. A leading or lagging UAV
may still be a better option for more complex terrains and
locations of the transmitter, receiver and eavesdropper. This
has to do with the terrain surrounding the nodes and, hence,
radio channel. In general, the UAV should position itself such
that it provides a high data rate to the IoT device and a low
data rate to the eavesdropper.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers the mobile IoT context and analyzes
how UAVs can be deployed to improve the secrecy rate
of terrestrial IoT devices being served by cellular networks.
IoT devices may be carried by vehicles, but many devices
will likely have lower protection mechanisms against secu-
rity exploits because of cost or other resource constraints.
An eavesdropper may thus be able to sniff and decode the
transmitted data. Besides many cellular control channels are
sent in the clear and the eavesdropper may gain insights
simply from RF monitoring of control data. Under these
premises, we have modeled and numerically analyzed the
secrecy rate of the wireless channel in the context of mobile
IoT with eavesdropping. The simulation results provide new
insights on the effectiveness of physical-layer security against
eavesdropping using UAV relays. The results show that a
single aerial relay considerably increases the secrecy rate and
largely outperforms the traditional approach of user association
Fig. 4: Secrecy rate comparison between different aerial relay tracking paths with respect to the mobile IoT device.
to another base station. These results are promising and extend
early works that explore the use of UAVs to improve the
security of cellular communications.
Further research is needed for fundamentally solidifying the
proposed concepts as well as for integrating them into com-
mercial communications systems. Experimental research will
be critical for this and requires large-scale test facilities that
enable 3D mobility experiments. The Aerial Experimentation
and Research Platform for Advanced Wireless (AERPAW)
will provide such a testbed where modern communications
systems and UAVs will be operated in real operating envi-
ronments [16]. AERPAW will allow evaluating trajectory and
UAV speed optimization algorithms, as well as exploring coor-
dinated mechanisms between terrestrial and aerial networking
nodes and their different modes of operation.
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